"The normative ethicist is interested in questions regarding the underlying principles that guide the applied ethicist. For example, in working out what is right or wrong, should only the consequences matter?(Fisher 2)
"Applied ethicists are interested in moral questions regarding particullar [moral] issues such as ... whether hunting is wrong " (Fisher 1)
"Finally, there is the football analyst... who does not kick the ball or interpret the rules for the players but tries to understand and comment on what is going on in the game itself. This is like the metaethicist who asks questions about the very practice of ethics... ''meta'' in metaethics is not about being ''transformed'' or ''changing'' ... it means to ''stand back from'', to ''think about'' or ''sit apart from'' ethics.'' (Fisher 2)
Skaidrė: 2
Cognitivism and Non-cognitivism
According to a cognitivist, a moral claim such as "Murder is wrong" is both "expressing a belief...[and] can be true or false" (Fisher 6). Which means that whenever someone makes a moral claim, they are expressing a cognitive state of mind
While a non-cognitivist, would see moral claims as"expressing a non-belief state such as an emotion...[so] to say that "killing is wrong" is to express disapproval towards killing... as if you are saying 'Boo! Killing!'" (Fisher 7). Thus, if moral claims are expressions they can't be truth-apt, at least with how cognitivists see them as truth-apt
"Cognitivism is not the view that moral claims are true...[it] is a view about truth-aptness and not about truth" (Fisher 6)
While, "Non-cognitivism is not the view that moral claims are about our own mental states... it is not the claim that "killing is wrong" really means " I disapprove of killing"...[it's] describing a mental state, in this case my disapproval of killing"(Fisher 7)
Skaidrė: 3
I believe that the restaurant is closed
The epistemic regress argument
my calendar says so
the chef isn't working
It's a holiday
"It seems then that the beliefs we have gain justification by inference from other beliefs, but these are also beliefs that need justification, and so on."(Fisher 142)
"Claim that the regress stops because some beliefs are justified in virtue of being part of a coherent set of beliefs"(Fisher 143)
"Claim that the regress stops at beliefs but these beliefs are not justified"(Fisher 143)
Intuitionist
Sceptic
Coherentist
Skaidrė: 0
"Claim that the regress stops at beliefs and these beliefs are non-inferentially justified"(Fisher 143)
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